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Abstract
Bovens and Hartmann (2003a, 2003b) propose to analyze coherence as a confidence-boos-
ting property. On the basis of this idea, they construct a new probabilistic theory of
coherence. In this paper, I will attempt to show that the resulting measure of coherence
clashes with some of the intuitions that motivate it. Also, I will try to show that this clash
is not due to the view on coherence as a confidence-boosting property or to the general
features of the model that Bovens and Hartmann use to analyze coherence. It will turn
out that there is at least one other measure that is similarly based on the concept of a
confidence-boosting property, but does not have the same counterintuitive results.
1 Introduction
In their Bayesian Epistemology (2003a), Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann per-
suasively argue that one cannot define a measure of coherence without making
explicit what role coherence is to play. According to them, it makes sense to talk
of the coherence of a law firm or an ant-hill, but it makes no sense to argue that
they serve the same purpose: coherence in a law firm makes it more efficient, in an
ant-hill it aids the survival of the colony (op. cit.: 31). Consequently, any attempt
to construct a measure of coherence should first indicate what type of coherence
one wishes to measure, and what role coherence is supposed to play. According
to Bovens and Hartmann, the philosophically interesting notion of coherence is as
a property of an information set with the role of boosting our confidence in that
information set (ibid.). On the basis of this idea, they construct a probabilistic
theory of coherence.
The result of their approach is not an actual measure of coherence, in the sense
that each information set is assigned a specific value of coherence. Instead, they
define the relation of being no less coherent than, ‘<’. As they explain (op. cit.:
3, 35), this relation induces an ordering on the set of all information sets which
is not complete, meaning that it will not necessarily be the case that, given two
sets of propositions, one of the two is the most coherent. It may be arguable
that this indeterminacy is not problematic when it occurs in a case in which it is
intuitively not clear which of two sets is the more coherent. However, Douven and
Meijs (2004) and Meijs and Douven (2004) have shown that sometimes Bovens and
Hartmann’s theory of coherence will also refrain from judgement if one of the two
sets is intuitively clearly more coherent than the other. Hence in some cases their
measure behaves in an intuitively unsatisfying way. However, the case is even worse:
in section 3 of this paper I will show that their measure also fails to satisfy two very
general intuitions about coherence.
Nevertheless, the overall goal of this paper is constructive rather than destruc-
tive, for in section 4 I show that we need not blame Bovens and Hartmann’s general
approach for these counterexamples. Instead, the problem may lie in an additional
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element, which I will call the maximality requirement, that they add to their the-
ory. In section 5, I will show how abandoning the maximality requirement will lead
to a new measure of coherence that is equally based on coherence as a confidence-
boosting property, but that does not yield the same counterintuitive consequences.
The conclusion of this paper, therefore, will be that the examples proposed in
this and earlier papers do not necessarily challenge Bovens and Hartmann’s basic
intuitions. I will start by briefly introducing Bovens and Hartmann’s theory of
coherence.
2 Bovens and Hartmann’s Theory of Coherence
Define the notion of an information set S as a finite set of propositions, about
each of which we have been informed by a separate source. Call these information
sources witnesses and assume that they are independent of each other and neither
fully reliable nor fully unreliable. Also, suppose that they supply only positive or
negative reports, that is, the witnesses report that something is or is not the case;
they do not report probabilities. Let S be the set of all such information sets.
Assuming positive reports on all of the propositions in an information set, what
are the factors that determine our confidence that the conjunction of the proposi-
tions in that set is true? According to Bovens and Hartmann, there are three such
factors. These are, respectively, the prior probability that the information is true;
the reliability of the witnesses; and the measure in which the propositions cohere.
These factors should be expressed as ceteris paribus claims. The ceteris paribus
condition for coherence reads: ‘[w]hen we gather information, then the more coher-
ent the story that materializes is, the more confident we may be, ceteris paribus’
(2003a: 11). Similarly, an increase either in the prior probability of the conjunction
of propositions in an information set S or in the witness reliability will make us
more confident that the information is true, ceteris paribus.
In order to explain how Bovens and Hartmann determine the probability that the
conjunction of propositions in a set S is true, given positive reports on all of these
propositions, it is necessary to introduce some terminology. Given an information
set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} and a probability distribution p ( · ) over the elements of S,
let ‘ai’ stand for the sum of the probabilities of the conjunctions consisting of
n − i elements of S and the negations of all the remaining elements of S. So, for
instance, if S = {R1, R2}, then a0 = p (R1∧R2), a1 = p (R1∧¬R2) + p (¬R1∧R2),
and a2 = p (¬R1∧¬R2). Furthermore, let REPRj be a report by witness j to the
effect that Rj is the case (there is one witness for each proposition). To model the
reliability of the witnesses, let
pj =df p (REPRj | Rj) (1)
be the true-positive rate of witness j with respect to proposition Rj and let
qj =df p (REPRj | ¬Rj) (2)
be the rate of false positives. Assume that all witnesses are equally reliable: for
all j, we have pj = p and qj = q. Next, define
r =df 1− q/p (3)
as the reliability of the witnesses. They are assumed to be neither fully reliable
(r 6= 1) nor fully unreliable (r 6= 0); thus, r ∈ (0, 1).
With this terminology in place, let us look at Bovens and Hartmann’s derivation
of their measure of coherence. They start with calculating the posterior probability
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p∗(R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn) =df p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn), (4)
which gives the probability of the conjunction of the elements of set S given positive
reports with respect to all of these elements. Now it can be shown (see Bovens and
Hartmann 2003a, appendix A1) that if a0 > 0, the following relation holds:
p∗(R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn) =
a0∑n
i=0 ai(1− r)
i
. (5)
The probability boost b (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn) is defined as the ratio of the posterior prob-
ability and the prior probability:
b (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn) =
p∗(R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn)
p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn)
. (6)
As noted above, Bovens and Hartmann believe that there are three different fac-
tors that influence the probability boost: witness reliability, prior probability and
coherence. To find a true measure of coherence, therefore, one needs to distinguish
the degree to which coherence contributes to the value of b (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn) from the
contributions of witness reliability and prior probability. But it is not straightfor-
ward how this may be achieved. The basic problem is that although reliability may
be convincingly portrayed as being independent from coherence, this does not hold
for the prior probability. To see this, remember that the prior probability of the
information set is the prior probability that all the elements of the information set
are true, or, in set-theoretic terms, the measure in which they overlap. It should
be uncontroversial (and Bovens and Hartmann agree) that the measure in which
the propositions overlap is very important for the measure in which they cohere.
What this means is that the above ceteris paribus condition will be of little help for
determining a measure of coherence. If the thing that plays an important role for
coherence (to wit, the prior probability) must be kept constant for the definition to
apply, then we will have no way of measuring the contribution of the prior probabil-
ity to the coherence. An additional element or criterion is required to disentangle
the prior probability and the coherence of a set.
The element that Bovens and Hartmann add is what I will call the maximality
requirement. In their view a set is maximally coherent if it consists of equivalent
propositions (op. cit.: 32–35), where two propositions Ri and Rj are equivalent if
they are logically equivalent relative to the background knowledge.1 Let such a
set be an equivalent set and let a set be nonequivalent if not all of its propositions
are equivalent relative to the background knowledge. Furthermore, let two sets of
propositions Si and Sj be equivalent if the conjunctions of the propositions in the
sets are equivalent relative to the background knowledge. According to Bovens and
Hartmann, the property of maximal coherence should not depend on a set’s prior
probability or the number of propositions. Using this requirement, they define the
notion of a maximal confidence boost, i.e., the confidence boost a set would have
received if the information set had consisted of equivalent propositions, in other
words, if all of a1, . . . , an−1 had been zero (Bovens and Hartmann 2003a: 32–33).
In that case an = 1− a0,
2and so equation (5) reduces to
p∗max(R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn) =
a0
a0 + an(1− r)n
. (7)
1 That is, if K ∧ Ri ≡ K ∧ Rj , where K is the background knowledge. Following Bovens and
Hartmann, I will suppress reference to the background knowledge throughout this paper.
2 Since
  n
i=0 ai = 1 and in this case
  n−1
i=1 ai = 0, we have a0 + an = 1.
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Next, one can define a measure cr(S) as the fraction of the actual boost over the
maximum boost (for a derivation, see Bovens and Hartmann 2003a: 34):
cr(S) =df
b (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn)
bmax(R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn)
=
a0 + (1− a0)(1− r)
n∑n
i=0 ai(1− r)
i
. (8)
It is easy to see that cr(S) = 1 if R1, . . . , Rn are equivalent, and cr(S) < 1,
otherwise. Next, the difference function calculates the difference between the values
of cr for two different sets:
fr(S, S
′) = cr(S)− cr(S
′). (9)
Of course, this function still depends critically on the reliability of the witnesses.
All else equal, a higher value for r will raise the value of fr(S, S
′). According to
Bovens and Hartmann, coherence should be independent of witness reliability, and
they cancel out the dependence on the reliability by defining the two-place relation
of being no less coherent than, ‘<’, as follows: for all S, S ′ ∈ S,
S < S′ iff fr(S, S
′) > 0 for all values of r ∈ (0, 1). (10)
Interestingly, on this account there is no such thing as the coherence of a set:
it is impossible to say whether a set is (in)coherent. Instead, only comparative
judgements are possible: a set S is no less coherent than another set S ′ iff fr(S, S
′) >
0 for all values of the reliability parameter.3 Also, since fr(S, S
′) may be positive for
some values of r and negative for others, this analysis yields only a quasi-ordering:
it is reflexive and transitive, but not complete. That is, there may be sets S and S ′
such that neither S < S′ nor S′ < S. According to Bovens and Hartmann this is a
desirable result, since in some cases we are intuitively in the dark with respect to the
question which of two sets is the more coherent. However, as the next section will
show, even in some cases where we are very sure about which is the more coherent
of two sets, this analysis equally fails to yield a verdict.
3 Two Counterintuitive Consequences
In Meijs and Douven (2004) and Douven and Meijs (2004), three different examples
of counterintuitive consequences of the theory of Bovens and Hartmann have been
put forward. All of these proceed by presenting two sets of which it is intuitively
very clear which one is more coherent, but of which Bovens and Hartmann’s theory
withholds judgement. I will not rehearse these examples here. Instead, I will present
two different examples, which show that the difference function fails to satisfy two
general intuitions about coherence – intuitions, for that matter, that Bovens and
Hartmann seem to endorse.
Independence and Positive Dependence. In his (2003), Branden Fitelson argues
that independent sets should always be less coherent than positively dependent sets
and more coherent than negatively dependent sets. A general definition of positive
dependence requires that for all nonempty subsets Si and Sj of information set S,
if Si ∩Sj = ∅, then p (Si | Sj) > p (Si); for negative dependence the sign is reversed
and for independence p (Si | Sj) = p (Si) is used. Intuitively, it makes quite a lot
of sense to require that independent sets are always less coherent than positively
dependent sets.
3 One may feel that the introduction of the ‘<’-relation as ‘being no less coherent than’ is
rather awkward also. Would we not want our theory of coherence to produce a ‘’ relation of
being ‘more coherent than’? Nevertheless, this can easily be remedied by stipulating that S  S ′
iff fr(S, S′) > 0 for all values of r ∈ (0, 1) and fr(S, S′) > 0 for at least one value of r ∈ (0, 1).
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Fig. 1: A diagram for the probabilities of set SI.
To illustrate this, consider the following example, originally due to BonJour
(1985: 96):4
SI =
{
C = [This chair is brown], E = [Electrons are negatively charged],
T = [Today is Thursday]
}
.
In this set, the propositions may be assumed to be independent: the fact that
it is Thursday does not seem to affect the colour of the chair or the charge of
electrons, and vice versa. Also, we would feel hard pressed to call this set coherent
given any specification of the probabilities that makes these propositions come out
independent.
Moreover, Bovens and Hartmann agree with this general intuition. Following
BonJour, they compare the first set with another of which ‘there is no doubt’
(Bovens and Hartmann 2003a: 29) that it is more coherent. I will give a slightly
different version of that set, since in BonJour’s example, it is still the case that two
of the three propositions are independent. Therefore, consider set SP :
SP =
{
B = [This bird is black], R = [This bird is a crow],
L = [This bird has a life-long mate]
}
.
In this second set, the three propositions greatly support each other: in general
crows are black and establish life-long relationships and vice versa. According to
Fitelson’s intuition, this implies that set SI must be more coherent than set SP.
Since this example is actually stronger than the original example by BonJour (in
this case all of the propositions support each other), again there can be no doubt
that the second set is more coherent than the first. This intuition seems independent
of the marginal probabilities of the propositions in these sets: as long as they are
independent in the first set and positively dependent in the second, it seems to
matter little how probable they are.
Interestingly, however, when Bovens and Hartmann discuss how the difference
function fares with respect to this example, they choose a probability model in
which the unconditional probabilities of the propositions are (almost) equal. It is
highly uncertain whether Bovens and Hartmann chose this probability model on
purpose. According to them what is essential about what I have called set SI is
4 The brackets around the sentences are used to refer to the sentences’ propositional contents.
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Fig. 2: A diagram for the probabilities of set SP.
that it is probabilistically independent, not that is has almost the same values for
the unconditional probabilities as the other set. Moreover, intuitively there seems to
be little reason for any such restriction. It seems irrelevant for the question at hand
whether or not the propositions in the first set are highly (im)probable. Instead, it
appears that set SP should be more coherent than SI for all models in which the
first is positively dependent and the second is independent.
Nevertheless, even if one accepts this additional constraint, there are still prob-
ability models in which it is not the case that SP is more coherent than SI. For
example, consider a model for the sets SI and SP in which all six propositions have
the same unconditional probability of .1. Since set SI is independent, the value
of p (RIj ) directly determines the values of a
I
0, . . . , a
I
3 (one can read off these values
from figure 1).
For set SP assume that a2 = 0, i.e., in the population we are studying (1) there
are no crows that are neither black nor have a life-long mate, (2) there are no birds
that have a life-long mate but are neither black nor crows and (3) there are no
black birds that are neither crows nor have a life-long mate. Also, assume that the
probability of a bird being a crow and black and having a life-long mate equals .016.
Given the fact that the unconditional probabilities are all .1, the other probabilities
follow directly (they can be read off from figure 2). It is not hard to see that in this
case SP is positively dependent and so, following Fitelson’s suggestion, it should
hold that SP is more coherent than SI.
But now look at the difference function:
fr(S
P , SI) =
.016 + .984(1− r)3
.016 + .126(1− r) + .858(1− r)3
−
.001 + .999(1− r)3
.001 + .027(1− r) + .243(1− r)2 + .729(1− r)3
.
(11)
This gives the graph depicted in figure 3.
Clearly, it is not the case that fr(S
P , SI) > 0 for all values of the reliability
parameter. Therefore, Bovens and Hartmann’s theory has the consequence that
a positively dependent set may fail to be more coherent than an independent set,
even if both have the same unconditional probabilities.5 This seems to be a very
unwelcome result.
5 Without the restriction that the unconditional probabilities are equal, the original example by
Bovens and Hartmann (2003a: 40–43) can easily be modified so as to give a similar result as the
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Fig. 3: fr(S
P, SI).
Adding Propositions. A second general intuition about coherence is the idea that
it must be possible to increase the coherence of an information set by adding propo-
sitions. Evidently, it will not always be the case that adding a proposition increases
a set’s coherence from an intuitive standpoint. For example, if we add a propo-
sition that is inconsistent with the conjunction of the propositions in a set, then
we should not expect coherence to increase. However, the following theorem shows
that for Bovens and Hartmann’s theory of coherence, adding a proposition to an
information set will only increase the coherence of that set for an extremely limited
number of cases (for a proof, see the appendix):
Theorem 3.1 Adding a proposition Rm+1 to a set S = {R1, . . . , Rm} that is not
equivalent will increase S’s coherence iff Rm+1 is equivalent with
∧
S, i.e., iff
p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm | Rm+1) = p (Rm+1 | R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm) = 1.
Admittedly, adding a proposition that is equivalent with the conjunction of propo-
sitions in a set should intuitively increase the coherence of that set. But it seems
that there are many other ways in which the coherence may increase. For exam-
ple, consider the set SP defined above. Now suppose that in the population under
consideration all and only crows have been ringed. Furthermore, suppose that a
fourth independent witness reports that the bird in question was ringed. Consider
the following sets:
SP2 =
{
[This bird has a life-long mate], [This bird is a crow],
[This bird is black], [This bird is ringed]
}
;
SP =
{
[This bird has a life-long mate], [This bird is a crow],
[This bird is black]
}
.
one above. If one sets the marginal probabilities of the propositions in their set S, which is the
set consisting of independent propositions, lower than .22 or higher than .62, while leaving intact
the probability model for their set S′, which is the set consisting of (some) positively dependent
propositions, again no coherence ordering is possible anymore.
Alternatively, one may wish to impose different restrictions. For example, one may insist that
instead of the unconditional probabilities, the prior probabilities should be equal. However, in that
case similar examples are possible. For example, consider the set SP
′
with a0 = .001, a1 = .03 and
a2 = 0 and compare this with set SI above. In this case, SP
′
and SI have equal prior probabilities,
while SP
′
is positively dependent. Still, fr(SP
′
, SI) < 0 for r > .9875.
Finally, a last option is to suppose that the value of an must remain equal, which means,
informally put, that the total area within the circles of the propositions remains equal. I cannot
see any justification for that move, although in Bovens and Hartmann’s example the values for
an and a′n are indeed equal. However, this alternative would not work either. For in this case
take a set SP
′′
with a0 = .122, a1 = .149 and a2 = 0 and compare this set with SI. It can easily
be checked that SP
′′
is positively dependent and that a′′n = a
I
n. However, fr(S
P ′′, SI) < 0 for
r < .14.
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It would seem that the first set is more coherent than the second. But according to
Bovens and Hartmann’s account this is not the case, as figure 4 shows. Moreover,
adding any number of propositions will not increase the coherence, either, as long as
none of them is equivalent with the propositions already there. This, again, seems
to be a very counterintuitive result.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-0.1
-0.05
0.05
Fig. 4: fr(S
P
2 , S
P ).
4 Equivalent Sets and Maximal Coherence
The previous section has presented two important problems for Bovens and Hart-
mann’s theory of coherence. Apparently in their theory it is not always the case
that a positively dependent set is more coherent than an independent set, even if
the propositions in both sets have the same unconditional probabilities. Moreover,
adding one (or more) proposition(s) will hardly ever increase a set’s coherence.
Now the question naturally arises whether or not these results are unavoid-
able given the model that Bovens and Hartmann have chosen for their analysis of
coherence. As noted above, Bayesian Epistemology introduces both the idea of co-
herence as a confidence-boosting property and the concept of modelling coherence
as a property of an information set with independent witnesses reporting on the
propositions of that information set. If the possibility of examples like those above
is the necessary byproduct of such an approach, then this would imply that it is a
highly unsatisfying framework for analyzing coherence. This would be an important
conclusion, for it would seriously challenge either the use of witnesses to analyze
coherence or even the view on coherence as a confidence-boosting property. Neither
is the case, as I will argue now. More specifically, I will show how Bovens and
Hartmann’s basic framework can serve to define at least one measure which does
not share the same counterintuitive conclusions.
My basic strategy will be to deny the maximality requirement. In section 2, I
have indicated that Bovens and Hartmann need an additional element in order to
distinguish coherence and prior probability. As intimated there, this requirement
stipulates that equivalent sets are maximally coherent per se, i.e., irrespective of
the value of a0 and of the number of propositions. However, the choice for this re-
quirement seems arbitrary. Nothing in a view of coherence as a confidence-boosting
property or in a model using partially reliable witnesses implies that a notion of
maximal coherence should be independent of the number of propositions or the
probability of their conjunction. To the contrary, there seems to be a very good
reason to reject the validity of the maximality requirement, at least within this
model. The reason is that this requirement implies that the posterior probability
must depend on more than the coherence, the prior probability and the reliability
of the witnesses.
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Consider two independent witnesses with fixed reliability.6Assume furthermore
that they give equivalent reports, i.e., that the propositions they report as being true
overlap completely. Next, a new witness enters the stage, similar to the first two in
that this witness, too, has a fixed reliability and this witness, too, positively reports
on a proposition that is equivalent to the other two. Since the three propositions
overlap fully, a1 = a2 = 0, and it is a straightforward exercise to show that p
∗(R1 ∧
R2 ∧ R3) > p
∗(R1 ∧ R2) for all a0 ∈ (0, 1): our confidence that the information is
true has gone up. This is what we would expect, of course: various independent
reports that something is the case will increase our confidence that it is in fact the
case. However, in this example all three of the determinants of our confidence in
a set remained constant: the reliability was fixed, the prior probability remained
equal, and the set was maximally coherent to begin with, so the coherence must
have remained equally maximal also. But what, then, has caused our increase in
confidence? Well, it seems that either we must find a fourth factor that influences
the posterior probability, or relinquish the maximality requirement. If we allow
that a set with three equivalent propositions is more coherent than a set with two
equivalent propositions, then the problem disappears: the increase in the posterior
probability is caused by an increase in the coherence. Therefore, until Bovens
and Hartmann present us with this fourth factor, their account of the factors that
influence our confidence in an information set is actually inconsistent with their
account of coherence.7
Summarizing the above: not only is the maximality intuition independent of
the basic framework that Bovens and Hartmann use, it is also unsatisfactory given
this same basic framework. However, if it should be discarded, what other element
will be able to take its place? In the next section I will not attempt to find a new
requirement to replace the maximality requirement, although there may well be
some quite plausible options. Instead, I will show how a relatively small adjustment
in the ceteris paribus conditions that Bovens and Hartmann propose will make such
an additional requirement superfluous. A measure of coherence can then be based
directly on the revised versions of those conditions.
5 An Alternative to Bovens and Hartmann’s Measure of
Coherence
In section 2, I argued that no measure of coherence can be constructed on the basis
of the idea that one should be more confident in a more coherent set, given equal
reliability and equal prior probability. The reason for this is that prior probability
and coherence are not independent notions. Of course this need not be an imped-
iment to the construction of a measure of coherence: as intimated above, Bovens
and Hartmann simply add a requirement (to wit, the maximality requirement) from
which their measure follows quite straightforwardly. However, the last section has
criticized this intuition. So it seems that at least one way to proceed would be to
search for a more plausible intuition and construct a measure on that basis. Alter-
natively, one may try to find three determinants of confidence that can be modelled
as independent of one another. This is the approach that I will pursue in the rest
of this paper.
Before I start, let me be clear about the goal of this project. Emphatically, I
6 One may assume that the witnesses are actual persons reporting on propositions and that
long experience with these people has taught us the true- and false-positive rates of their reports.
Alternatively, one may assume the witnesses to be independent measurement instruments of which
we likewise know the number of true and false positives.
7 The maximality requirement faces other, more general, problems also. For an argument against
the maximality requirement that does not depend on Bovens and Hartmann’s theory, see Douven
and Meijs (2004).
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am not trying to present a foundation for a new measure of coherence. Instead, I
am merely trying to show how Bovens and Hartmann’s difference function can be
adjusted in order to evade the problems that I have raised in the previous sections.
In doing so I will try to deviate as little as possible from Bovens and Hartmann’s
original model. Those who did not find that model or, for that matter, the notion
of coherence as a confidence-boosting property, plausible will not find an answer
to their misgivings in this paper. Instead, it addresses those who were equally
attracted by Bovens and Hartmann’s original theory as worried by the examples
put forward against that theory in this and earlier papers.
In this revised version of Bovens and Hartmann’s theory, coherence will still be
a property of an information set and it will remain a confidence-boosting property
in the sense that the more coherent the story is, the more confident we will be
that the information is true, ceteris paribus. What will be different, however, is
the explication of the ceteris paribus condition. Instead of requiring equal prior
probability, I will require equal unconditional probabilities. That is, according to
me, one should be more confident in an information set if it is more coherent, given
equal reliability and equal unconditional probabilities. This will make our confi-
dence in an information set depend on the unconditional probabilities, the witness
reliability and the coherence, but no longer on the prior probability. In that case,
a set becomes more coherent if its unconditional probabilities and the reliability
of the witnesses remain equal while the value of p∗(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) increases. And
similarly, if the unconditional probabilities of an independent set increase without
altering the fact that they are independent, we will become more convinced that
the information is true, while the coherence will be left untouched.
But, rather surprisingly perhaps, it has now become possible to construct a
measure on the basis of only this description of coherence as a confidence-boosting
property. For while it is certainly not the case that prior probability and coher-
ence are independent, it is not evident at all that unconditional probabilities and
coherence cannot be modelled as independent.
Above I have argued that sets consisting of independent propositions have neu-
tral coherence, no matter how plausible they are. This at least seems to strongly
suggest that the unconditional probabilities do not determine the degree of a set’s
coherence. Now if one agrees with this, then it becomes possible to measure coher-
ence by comparing the actual probability boost with the probability boost the set
would have gotten had all its propositions been independent (but with the same
unconditional probabilities and the same witness reliability).8
To formalize this idea, again consider the set S of information sets. But now
define the notion p∗ind(R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn) as the posterior probability of the information
set S = {R1, . . . , Rn}, had the information come in as independent propositions
with the same unconditional probabilities. Call the set consisting of the same
propositions as S, with the same unconditional probabilities, but in which these
propositions are independent, set S i and let bind(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) be the probability
boost of the independent set. Next, let aij stand for the sum of the probabilities
of the conjunctions consisting of n − j elements of S i and the negations of all the
remaining elements of S i. From these elements, one can construct a new coherence
8 One may feel that the proposal to compare a set’s coherence with the coherence it would have
gotten had the information come in in an independent fashion, does not immediately follow from
the above ceteris paribus conditions. Although I would say that it seems to be the only possible
option, the worry can be parried in another way as well. Just as Bovens and Hartmann add the
maximality requirement, one may add, in this case, what may be called the independence require-
ment, which says that independent sets should have neutral coherence. From this requirement the
measure proposed below follows smoothly.
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measure:
cir(S) =df
b (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn)
bind(R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn)
=
a0
ai0
∑n
i=0 a
i
i(1− r)
i∑n
i=0 ai(1− r)
i
, (12)
and a new difference function:
f ir(S, S
′) = cir(S)− c
i
r(S
′). (13)
As in the original case, S <i S
′ iff f ir(S, S
′) > 0 for all values of r ∈ (0, 1).
At first glance, this account has some important advantages over the old one. For
one, it now becomes possible to define the properties of coherence and incoherence
of a set, which I shall call i-coherence:
Definition 5.1 A set S is i-coherent iff cir(S) > 0 for all values of r ∈ (0, 1); it is
i-incoherent iff cir(S) < 0 for all values of r ∈ (0, 1).
Also, let me stress that this alternative measure leaves intact most of Bovens and
Hartmann’s model. Firstly, coherence is still a confidence-boosting property of an
information set. Secondly, the independence of the propositions of the information
set is still analyzed in terms of independent witnesses reporting on propositions in an
information set. And finally, the coherence relation ‘<i’ remains a quasi-ordering.
But more importantly, the new measure gives the intuitively correct answers to
the examples given in section 3. Figures (5) and (6) show the graphs of f ir(S
P, SI)
and f ir(S
P
2 , S
P ). Clearly, both graphs are positive for all values of the reliability
parameter. Therefore, this revised version of Bovens and Hartmann’s measure of
coherence agrees with our intuitive judgements that the positively dependent set SP
defined above is more coherent than the independent set SI and that SP2 is more
coherent than SP. Moreover, this measure gives the intuitively correct answers to
the examples brought forward against the original difference function in Douven
and Meijs (2004) and Meijs and Douven (2004). And finally, it agrees with almost
all the examples that Bovens and Hartmann discuss in their (2003a) and (2003b).
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14
Fig. 5: f ir(S
P, SI).
To be precise, the new measure disagrees with Bovens and Hartmann’s intuitions
in only two examples. The first of these is the example that Bovens and Hartmann
(2003a: 50–53) use to criticize Fitelson’s (2003) measure. I will not discuss this
example any further, since, contrary to Bovens and Hartmann’s discussion, I do not
believe that it is such an intuitively clear example. For a criticism of this example,
see Douven and Meijs (2004).
The second example on which the two measures differ might be considered more
important, since it is the only example that Bovens and Hartmann give of two sets
between which no coherence ordering is possible. Here is the example. A murder
has been committed in Tokyo but the corpse is still to be found. A 100-square grid
5 An Alternative to Bovens and Hartmann’s Measure of Coherence 12
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Fig. 6: f ir(S
P
2 , S
P ).
has been drawn over the map of the city and initially the corpse is equally likely to
be found in any of the squares. Now consider two different situations, δ and , in
each of which two independent and equally, but partially, reliable witnesses report
about the location of the corpse. In situation δ the two witnesses report squares
41–60 and 51–70. In situation  the witnesses report squares 39–61 and 50–72.
Define ‘Sδ’ and ‘S’ as the information sets containing the witness reports of
situations δ and , respectively. Given the above probabilities, we have aδ0 = .10,
aδ1 = .20, a

0 = .12, and a

1 = .22. Since f (S
δ, S) is positive for values of r between
0 and, approximately, .7 and negative for values of r between, approximately, .7
and 1, we have neither Sδ < S nor S < Sδ. However, as figure 7 shows, f ir(S
δ, S)
is larger than 0 for all values of r, and therefore, Sδ <i S
.
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Fig. 7: f ir(S
δ, S).
According to the difference function there is no fact of the matter as to which set
is more coherent, and Bovens and Hartmann believe that this constitutes a point
in favor of their theory. In such cases, they think, a theory of coherence should
withhold judgement. But it seems telling that almost all the other recently proposed
probabilistic measures of coherence side with f ir(S
δ, S). Fitelson’s, Shogenji’s and
the three measures proposed in Douven and Meijs (2004) all point to Sδ as being
more coherent than S.9Only according to Olsson’s (2002) tentative proposal is the
opposite the case.10 So there is at least some reason to argue that Sδ is more
coherent than S. Moreover, this conclusion is not incompatible with Bovens and
Hartmann’s claim that in this case it is intuitively not clear which set is more
9 Shogenji’s (1999) measure yields Sδ = 2.5 and S ≈ 2.27; Fitelson’s (2003) measure yields
Sδ = .6 and S ≈ .57, the three measures discussed in Douven and Meijs (2004) yield Cd(S
δ) = .3,
Cd(S
) ≈ .29, Cr(Sδ) = 2.5, Cr(S) ≈ 2.27, Cl(S
δ) = 4.0, Cl(S
) ≈ 3.6.
10 This measure yields Sδ ≈ .333 and S ≈ .353.
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coherent. We may intuitively be unable to see the difference in coherence for the
simple reason that it is too small for us to recognize.
As can be seen from the values of the respective measures, according to all of
the measures mentioned above the differences in coherence between the two sets are
indeed minute, which would explain our being unable to point to the most coherent
set. Of course, Bovens and Hartmann’s framework does not supply a mechanism
with which to decide how much more coherent a set is than another, which makes
it impossible to distinguish between intuitively very clear cases and intuitively less
clear cases. This is just a natural result of their approach. However, it is quite easy
to add such an element to f ir(S, S
′). For example, one could take the maximum
value of f ir(S, S
′) or the area beneath its graph to be indicative of the degree to
which S is more coherent than S ′ (assuming f ir(S, S
′) ≥ 0 for all r). In the case
of Sδ and S, both proposals would lead to the conclusion that the difference in
coherence between Sδ and S is much smaller than in any of the other examples.
As a last remark, let me note that although this measure does not satisfy the
maximality requirement, it does satisfy a less stringent condition, to wit, that sets
consisting of equivalent propositions are maximally coherent, given constant un-
conditional probabilities and equal reliability of the witnesses (for a proof, see the
appendix):
Theorem 5.1 Any equivalent set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} with unconditional probabil-
ities p (Ri) = α is more i-coherent than any nonequivalent set S
′ with the same
number of propositions and the same unconditional probabilities.
Thus, given two sets with the same unconditional probabilities for all the proposi-
tions, if only one of them is equivalent, it will be more i-coherent than the other.
Or, alternatively, given fixed unconditional probabilities, the most i-coherent way
information can accumulate is if the propositions are all equivalent.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that Bovens and Hartmann’s theory of coherence runs
into some serious problems. It turned out that in some cases a positively dependent
set is not more coherent than an independent set, even if both consist of the same
number of propositions with the same unconditional probabilities. Also, it turned
out that adding arbitrarily many propositions to a set cannot make it more coherent
if these propositions are not equivalent with the conjunction of the propositions
already there.
One of the suggestions of this paper has been that the maximality requirement
should be discarded. Not only does it lead to a measure that is intuitively un-
satisfying, it is also at odds with Bovens and Hartmann’s view on coherence as
a confidence-boosting property. As I have remarked in section 4, the maximality
requirement leads to the conclusion that no matter how many equivalent proposi-
tions a set consists of, it will be equally coherent to any other set with equivalent
propositions. In light of the view on coherence as a confidence-boosting property,
this does not make sense.
But the main conclusion of this paper must be that a view on coherence as a
confidence-boosting property does not directly determine a measure of coherence,
even if one accepts the independent-witness model. In section 5 I have discussed one
alternative, and it seems safe to conclude that it behaves in a much more satisfactory
way than Bovens and Hartmann’s proposal.
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Appendix: Proofs of Propositions 3.1 and 5.1
Theorem 3.1 Adding a proposition Rm+1 to a set S = {R1, . . . , Rm} that is not
equivalent will increase S’s coherence iff Rm+1 is equivalent with
∧
S, i.e., iff
p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm | Rm+1) = p (Rm+1 | R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm) = 1.
Proof: I will start by showing that adding a proposition Rm+1 to any set S =
{R1, . . . , Rm} will not increase S’s coherence if Rm+1 is not equivalent with S. To
this end, consider two sets S = {R1, . . . , Rm} and S
′ = {R1, . . . , Rm, Rn}, where
n = m + 1. For convenience, substitute bi’s for the a
′
i’s of S
′.
Either b0 = 0 or b0 > 0. In the first case, f(S
′, S) is not defined, and, therefore,
S′ cannot be more coherent than S. Thus, b0 must be larger than 0.
For it to be the case that S′ is not more coherent than S, there must be at least
one value r0 such that fr0(S
′, S) < 0. Furthermore, note that for this to be the case
it would suffice if the derivative of fr(S
′, S) is negative in r = 0, since this implies
that fr(S
′, S) < 0 for values of r approximating 0.11 To find the expression for the
derivative of fr(S
′, S) for r = 0, first consider cr(S
∗) for a set S∗ = {R1, . . . , RK}
with K propositions:
c(S∗) =
a0 + (1− a0)(1− r)
K∑K
i=0 ai(1− r)
i
,
where I have dropped the subscript r. Next, substitute 1− r = x. Then:
d c(S∗)
dr
= −
d c(x)
dx
.
For r approximating 0, x approximates 1. Next, calculate
(d c(x)
dx
)
x=1
using∑K
i=0 ai = 1:(
d c(x)
dx
)
x=1
=
((
1∑K
i=0 aix
i
)
K(1− a0)x
K−1
)
x=1
−

(a0 + (1− a0)xK)


∑K
i=0 aiix
i−1(∑K
i=0 aix
i
)2




x=1
=
(
1∑K
i=0 ai
)
K(1− a0) − (a0 + (1− a0))


∑K
i=0 aii(∑K
i=0 ai
)2


= K(1− a0) −
(
K∑
i=0
aii
)
= K(1− a0) −
(
K−1∑
i=0
iai + KaK
)
= K(1− a0) −
(
K−1∑
i=0
iai + K
(
1−
K−1∑
i=0
ai
))
= (K −Ka0) −
(
K +
K−1∑
i=0
(i−K)ai
)
11 I thank Stephan Hartmann for pointing out that this approach is much easier than the one I
originally had in mind.
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= −Ka0 −
(
K−1∑
i=0
(i−K)ai
)
= −
K−1∑
i=1
(i−K)ai.
Since d c(S
∗)
dr = −
d c(x)
dx , it follows that
(
d c(S∗)
dr
)
r=0
=
K−1∑
i=1
(i−K)ai. (1)
Using equation (1), the derivative of f(S ′, S) for sets S = {R1, . . . , Rm} and
S′ = {R1, . . . , Rm, Rn} equals
(
d f(S′, S)
dr
)
r=0
=
n−1∑
i=1
(i− n)bi −
m−1∑
i=1
(i−m)ai
=
m−1∑
i=1
(m− i)ai −
n−1∑
i=1
(n− i)bi. (2)
In order to compare the two sums above, it is necessary to derive a relation between
the ai’s and the bi’s. Start with dividing the bi’s in two parts: b
Rn
i is the part
of bi where Rn is true and b
¬Rn
i is the part of bi where Rn is false. In that case,
bRni + b
¬Rn
i = bi and b
¬Rn
0 = b
Rn
n = 0. Also:
n∑
i=0
b¬Rni =
n∑
i=1
b¬Rni = 1− p (Rn). (3)
Furthermore, b0 can be expressed in terms of a0 and b
¬Rn
1 by using the law of total
probability:
b0 = p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm ∧Rn)
= p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm) − p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm ∧ ¬Rn)
= a0 − b
¬Rn
1 . (4)
The same type of relation can be derived for all bi. By definition, b
Rn
i is the sum of
all possible combinations in which Rn is true and precisely i propositions are false:
bRni =
∑
i-many ¬Rk’s,
(m−i)-many Rk’s
p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm ∧Rn)
with k ≤ m. Again by the law of total probability,
bRni =
∑
i-many ¬Rk’s,
(m−i)-many Rk’s
(p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm)− p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm ∧ ¬Rn))
=
∑
i-many ¬Rk’s,
(m−i)-many Rk’s
p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm) −
∑
i-many ¬Rk’s,
(m−i)-many Rk’s
p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm ∧ ¬Rn).
The first term on the right-hand side of the last equation equals ai: it is the sum
of all the joint probabilities of all combinations of set S where i propositions are
false and all others are true. The second term equals b¬Rni+1 : it is the sum of the
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joint probabilities of all combinations of set S ′ in which Rn and precisely i other
propositions are false. Therefore:
bRni = ai − b
¬Rn
i+1 (5)
and
bi = b
Rn
i + b
¬Rn
i = ai − b
¬Rn
i+1 + b
¬Rn
i . (6)
Substituting this in expression (2) and using n = m + 1 gives:
m−1∑
i=1
(m− i)ai −
n−1∑
i=1
(n− i)bi
=
m−1∑
i=1
(m− i)ai −
n−1∑
i=1
(n− i)
(
ai + b
¬Rn
i − b
¬Rn
i+1
)
=
m−1∑
i=1
(m− i)ai −
m∑
i=1
(m + 1− i)ai −
m∑
i=1
(n− i)b¬Rni +
m∑
i=1
(n− i)b¬Rni+1
=
m−1∑
i=1
((m− i)ai − (m + 1− i)ai)− am −
m∑
i=1
(n− i)b¬Rni +
m+1∑
i=2
(n− i + 1)b¬Rni
=
m−1∑
i=1
(−ai)− am −
m∑
i=1
(n− i)b¬Rni +
m+1∑
i=2
(n− i + 1)b¬Rni
=
m∑
i=1
(−ai)− (n− 1)b
¬Rn
1 −
m∑
i=2
(n− i)b¬Rni +
m∑
i=2
(n− i + 1)b¬Rni + b
¬Rn
n
= −
m∑
i=1
ai −mb
¬Rn
1 +
m∑
i=2
b¬Rni + b
¬Rn
n
= −
m∑
i=1
ai +
n∑
i=1
b¬Rni − b
¬Rn
1 −mb
¬Rn
1 .
Filling in equations (3) and (4) and substituting
∑m
i=1 ai = 1− a0, it is possible to
derive a simple expression for the derivative of f(S ′, S) for r = 0:(
d f(S′, S)
dr
)
r=0
= −1 + b0 + b
¬Rn
1 + 1− p (Rn)− b
¬Rn
1 −mb
¬Rn
1
= b0 − p (Rn)−mb
¬Rn
1
= p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm ∧Rn) − p (Rn) −
mp (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm ∧ ¬Rn)
= p (Rn) (p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm | Rn)− 1) −
mp (¬Rn) p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm | ¬Rn).
From this it follows directly that the derivative of f(S ′, S) for r = 0 is negative if
p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rm | Rn) < 1, or if p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rm | ¬Rn) > 0. Therefore, adding
a proposition Rm+1 to a set of propositions S = {R1, . . . , Rm} will not increase its
coherence if Rm+1 is not equivalent with S.
If Rm+1 is equivalent with S, coherence will increase if set S is nonequivalent.
For consider the coherence function for set S ′ = {R1, . . . , Rm, Rn}:
cr(S
′) =
b0 + (1− b0)(1− r)
n∑n
i=0 bi(1− r)
i
.
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If Rn is equivalent with R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rm, then b0 = a0, b1 = 0 and bi+1 = ai for i ≥ 1.
Therefore:
cr(S
′) =
a0 + (1− a0)(1− r)
n
a0 +
∑n
i=2 ai−1(1− r)
i
=
a0 + (1− a0)(1− r)
n
a0 +
∑m
i=1 ai(1− r)
i+1
=
a0
(1−r) + (1− a0)(1− r)
m
a0
(1−r) +
∑m
i=1 ai(1− r)
i
It is fairly easy to show that for all α, β, γ, δ ∈ (0, 1), if γ < δ,
α
β
+ γ
α
β
+ δ
>
α + γ
α + δ
.
If S is nonequivalent, then
m∑
i=1
ai(1− r)
m <
m∑
i=1
ai(1− r)
i,
and thus (1 − a0)(1 − r)
m <
∑m
i=1 ai(1 − r)
i. Therefore, for all 0 < r < 1 and all
0 < a0 < 1, we have
cr(S
′) >
a0 + (1− a0)(1− r)
m
a0 +
∑m
i=1 ai(1− r)
i
= cr(S).
Therefore, fr(S
′, S) =df cr(S
′) − cr(S) > 0 for all values of r and thus S
′ is more
coherent than S. 
Theorem 5.1 Any equivalent set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} with unconditional probabil-
ities p (Ri) = α is more i-coherent than any nonequivalent set S
′ with the same
number of propositions and the same unconditional probabilities.
Proof: Consider a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} consisting only of equivalent propositions
with probability p (Ri) = α. Next consider a second set S
′ = {R′1, . . . , R
′
n} with the
same number of propositions, each of which has unconditional probability p (R′i) =
α, but in which at least one proposition or subset of propositions is independent of
all the others.
First, note that since all propositions in both sets have the same unconditional
probabilities, the posterior probabilities of the independent sets are equal: p∗(SI) =
p∗(SI ′).
Next, note that in this case a0 > a
′
0. Therefore, the actual posterior probability
of the first set is larger than that of the second: p∗(S) > p∗(S′). Thus, cir(S) >
cir(S
′) for all r, and therefore f ir(S, S
′) is positive for all values of the reliability
parameter r. 
